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Abstract: 
We exploit a unique historical setting to investigate how refugee-specific government aid affects 
the medium-term outcomes of refugees who migrate as children and young adults. German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) refugees who escaped to West Germany between 1946 and 1961 who 
were acknowledged to be “political refugees” were eligible for refugee-targeted aid, but only after 
1953. We combine several approaches to address identification issues resulting from the fact that 
refugees eligible for aid are both self-selected and screened by local authorities. We find positive 
effects of aid-eligibility on educational attainment, job quality and income among the refugees who 
migrated as young adults (aged 15-24). We do not find similar effects of aid-eligibility for refugees 
who migrated as children (aged 1-14). The overall results suggest that factors coming from the 
refugee experience per se do not impact negatively on the later-in-life socio-economic success of 
refugees. The often-found negative effects in various measures of integration in other refugee 
episodes are therefore likely driven by confounding factors that our unique historical setting 
mitigates. 
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1. Introduction 
Refugees receive much attention in the current political climate, where there is vigorous debate 
about the large influx of refugees from countries such as Syria and Afghanistan. Many destination 
countries have programs designed to help these refugees adjust to their new environments, often 
providing financial support to meet basic needs as well as job-search assistance. By doing so, they 
acknowledge the challenges that refugees face. At the same time, however, there is increasing 
concern about the growing burden of welfare expenditures on refugees.1   
Refugee children are a particularly vulnerable population—families arrive to a foreign location, 
often with no resources.  While there is a substantial literature documenting the long-run 
consequences of child poverty and the benefits of targeted public policy, there is very little research 
documenting the role of targeted policies for refugees on the outcomes of the refugee children, 
despite the importance of the topic. 2  In this paper, we examine the role of refugee-specific 
government aid paid to the parents’ generation on the medium-term outcomes of refugees who 
migrate from East to West Germany with their family as children (aged 1-14) and young adults 
(aged 15-24).   
A divided Germany in the post-WWII era provides us with a unique historical setting to 
examine the impact of refugee aid on refugees who arrive as children and young adults. From the 
end of the war in 1945 until the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, an estimated 3.6 to 4.5 million East 
Germans escaped from the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) and migrated to the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), or West Germany; a large fraction of refugees arrived as 
children or young adults. 3,4 
                                                          
1 There is surprising little research on how welfare affects the success of refugees. Exceptions are Andersen, Dustmann, 
and Landerso (2018) and LoPalo (2019), which we will review in detail further below. Those papers focus on refugees 
who migrate as adults, not their children, as we do. There is also research on refugee settlement policies and the 
consequences of ethnic enclave formation (Edin et al. 2003, Damm 2009); however, this work does not consider the 
effects of welfare programs. Papers have also stressed the importance of distinguishing refugees, or forced migrants 
more generally, from voluntary migrants in research (Becker and Ferrara, 2019; Dustmann et al. 2017). 
2 See Aizer et al. 2016, Chetty et al. 2011, Dahl and Lochner, 2012, Hoynes et al. 2016, and Løken et al. 2018, among 
others, for research on family resources, welfare programs and children’s outcomes outside the refugee context. Hoynes 
and Schanzenbach (2018) provide on excellent overview of the core childhood social safety net programs in the United 
States, how programs have changed over time, and how those changes altered the composition of those who benefit, 
as well as on research in that area of the literature. 
3 We refer to the East German part that in 1949 became the German Democratic Republic as “GDR” throughout the 
manuscript for ease of exposition. Before 1949, it was the Soviet Occupation Zone. 
4 According to our data, 32 percent of refugees arrived before the age of 15, and about 41 percent were between 15 
and 25 upon arrival. 
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Like refugees from other countries, East Germans left behind their belongings and social ties 
when they escaped from the East. Upon arrival in West Germany, they faced the economic, social, 
and psychological hardship brought about by flight experiences. However, unlike other refugee 
populations, these newcomers were physically indistinguishable from the West Germans, shared 
the same language, culture, religious background and – before 1945 – lived in the same country 
and shared similar war and other historical experiences. So, overall, this historical event provides 
us with several groups – refugee groups and natives – that are very similar but differ in terms of 
whether they fled their home and whether they were eligible for government aid.  This unique 
situation enables us to identify the effect of refugee aid on the academic and economic success of 
children whose families were displaced from their homes, belongings, and social network, but who 
did not have the additional burden of language and cultural assimilation, thus providing a better 
understanding of the role of additional economic resources on children’s academic success.  
The specific setting of our study allows us to eliminate factors that often distort the integration 
of migrants, among them language barriers, mismatch of educational and vocational degrees, and 
legal issues related to residence or work permits. While this might constrain the one-to-one 
generalizability of results to other (more typical) groups of refugees when they arrive as adults, this 
is less of a concern when focusing on child refugees since they learn the host country language 
quite fast and, depending on their age at arrival, are readily integrated into the host country 
educational system. However, parents’ obstacles to integration, including proficiency in the host 
country language, might matter for the outcomes of children. The analysis of our specific group of 
refugee children allows us to pin down the effects of government aid on families who must start 
anew—with the involuntary displacement, economic hardship, and social and psychological 
consequences that might be involved—while abstracting from other parental characteristics that 
potentially impede integration. The latter include host country language deficiencies, educational 
mismatch, and certain legal restrictions. 
Refugees to the FRG were initially housed in camps where they underwent severe screening 
from West German, U.S., British and French authorities.5 At the end of this screening which could 
                                                          
5 Despite the similarities between refugees and natives, the political climate at the time was such that the GDR refugees 
were not welcomed with open arms. In contrast, the authorities in West Germany saw the GDR refugees as potential 
threats to social stability because of common fears that the newcomers were criminals, smugglers, and Communist 
agents (Limbach, 2011). The Allied countries typically involved their intelligence units with the goal to detect 
communist spies or learn about strategic information the refugees might have. As Limbach (2011) states “…there is 
little difference how the FRG treated East Germans in 1952, and how they came to treat Croatian refugees in 1992 or 
Afghan refugees in 2010 (p. 3).” 
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take several weeks, GDR refugees were classified as either economic or political GDR refugees. 
Only the latter were considered genuine refugees which – after 1953 – made them eligible for 
refugee-specific support programs, while both groups could stay in the West.6  
The fact that both groups of refugees could remain in the West is important for our analysis, as 
it enables us to observe the entire pool of applicants, and not just those refugees who were eligible 
for aid. In addition, the fact that the welfare program for refugees was only introduced in 1953 – 
about 8 years into the refugee influx – helps with identification. For one, we can use information 
on the year of arrival in the West to show that the selection of refugee parents stayed constant over 
time and did not change after the welfare program was introduced. In addition, we can separately 
identify effects for those who became immediately eligible for government aid (because they 
arrived in 1953 or thereafter) and those who became eligible some years after arrival (because they 
arrived before 1953). 
Specifically, we analyze how refugee-specific government spending affects the medium-term 
economic success of refugees who arrived as children (1-14 years old) and as young adults (15-24 
years old). Age-at-arrival is an important determinant of integration success, typically for reasons 
that have to do with language proficiency (Bleakley and Chin 2010). In our context, given that 
refugees speak the same language as natives, the institutional connection to the host country is the 
most important reason for distinguishing the newcomers by age-at-arrival. Children younger than 
14 were subject to compulsory schooling, so they were readily integrated in the West German 
education system and were then naturally connected to the institutions of their new home country. 
Those who were 15-24 upon arrival were much less naturally institutionally integrated in West 
Germany. In principle, they could continue going to school, do an apprenticeship degree, attend 
university, or immediately start working.7 
Our empirical set-up differs in an important way from the one used in the “age-at-arrival” 
literature. While that literature distinguishes people who arrive in a new country at different ages, 
                                                          
6 Interestingly, the East Germans fleeing to the FRG represented various socio-economic backgrounds, and overall, 
compare well with the West German population at the time. Certain groups are overrepresented, including families 
with fathers who were self-employed, who were farmers, or who had a university degree. This occurred because the 
oppression by the GDR government was rooted in communist ideology aiming at increasing social equality and 
forming socialist personalities. To achieve that goal, the regime used parents’ education levels and occupations to 
identify families that needed intervention and re-education. We address this directly in our estimation strategy. 
7 Note that differences by age-at-arrival in institutional connection to the host country is also important in the context 
of other refugee groups. The refugee children from Syria, for example, who arrived in Germany before the age of 16 
have an immediate institutional connection to their new home country because of mandatory school requirements, 
whereas this is not the case for older refugees.  
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we condition on age-at-arrival, and then ask whether those who were eligible for government aid 
fared differently from those who were not eligible. 
We also argue that – although our focus is on children and young adults – the decision to flee 
the GDR was made by the parents. When it comes to identification, it is therefore important to 
show that parents did not base their decision on the age of their offspring, and we provide detailed 
balancing tests, in addition to other evidence. 
We observe outcomes of the refugee children at least 10 years after arrival. We therefore focus 
on their medium-term success. It could, for example, be that the impact of refugee-specific 
government aid is only important for refugee children in the short term and then dissipates with 
time in the country—particularly in countries where schooling is mandatory and tuition-free, and 
the social safety net is comprehensive. In contrast to children, young adults might be more 
vulnerable to an absence of refugee-specific government aid since they are less naturally linked to 
the educational institutions of the host country. Economic necessity combined with a lack of 
government assistance may preclude these young adult refugees from pursuing higher education, 
which might have been beneficial for their long-term well-being.  
Our data capture the father’s education, the mother’s education, the father’s industry, and the 
father’s occupational status. These are the most important observable characteristics that the GDR 
regime used to identify potential “class enemies” who needed re-education and other interventions 
to become “good socialist citizens.” Accordingly, the West German and Allied authorities also used 
these observable characteristics to determine who were genuine political refugees. One important 
concern was that if refugee-targeted support programs were implemented for all East Germans 
fleeing the GDR, this would encourage more to come. As a result, only in 1953 were refugee-
specific aid programs implemented for the GDR refugees. This decision came as a surprise, and 
only genuine political refugees became eligible for aid.8 
Thus, the difficult task of identifying the effect of government aid on outcomes is facilitated in 
our historical setting: we observe the whole pool of applicants; this pool is much more 
homogeneous than in other refugee cases, and it is very similar to the natives. The timing of the 
refugee-targeted aid program is such that we can apply a differences-in-differences approach, and, 
                                                          
8 The refugee-targeted government support programs were implemented in addition to the FRG’s welfare and social 
security system at the time and were intended to compensate for the hardship of the refugee experience. The supports—
including cash, eligibility for education allowance, job-search assistance, access to credit for businesses, and access to 
real estate loans—sought to improve the refugees’ chances of economic and social integration. 
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when also using the native West Germans as a control group, a triple differences-in-differences 
approach. Additionally, we know the most important variables used by the authorities to select 
those eligible for aid and can control for them. 
Our data is particularly well-suited for studying the effect of government aid on refugees. Using 
rich micro-census data collected in West Germany in 1971, we can identify refugees directly rather 
than relying on country of origin as an indicator of “likely refugees,” as is typically done in this 
context.9 In addition, we observe the whole pool of applicants. We know eligibility for government 
aid at the individual level, and we know the age and year of arrival in the FRG as well as a range 
of outcome variables in 1971.    
For refugees migrating as young adults (age-at-migration: 15-24), we find that immediate 
eligibility for government aid significantly improved the likelihood that they completed a higher 
level of education by 1971. Each additional potential year of aid-eligibility increases the probability 
of graduating from university by 1.2 percentage points, making those at the 75th percentile of the 
treatment distribution 6 percentage points more like to graduate from university than those at the 
25th percentile.  This is a large effect: only 14.2 percent of West German men aged 20-50 in 1971 
had graduated from university. In line with this effect on human capital accumulation, these 
refugees also had higher-status jobs in 1971 and higher net monthly incomes. 
Interestingly, we find little evidence of an effect of targeted aid to refugees who arrived in West 
Germany as children (age-at-migration: 1-14). For these refugees, schooling was compulsory, so 
they were readily integrated in the new host country educational institutions, and they faced no 
trade-off between investing in human capital or start working right away.  
Our results suggest that government spending makes a difference in situations where parents 
have very few resources at their disposal and, therefore, are highly liquidity constrained. If the 
children in those families are at ages in which they face trade-offs between investing in human 
capital and starting to work, government aid that alleviates the family’s financial constraints leads 
those children to invest more in human capital, and, ultimately, be more successful in the labor 
market. We find this to be true even when parents are highly skilled and even in a system where 
education is tuition-free. 
                                                          
9 See for example Borjas (2000), Cortes (2004), and LoPalo (2018). 
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We contribute to the surprisingly small literature on how welfare affects the success of refugees, 
much of which does not look at the effects of migrating as a child.10  Andersen, Dustmann, and 
Landerso (2019) study a 2002 reform of social assistance in Denmark that cut refugee benefit levels 
up to 50 percent and changed the modalities of how social assistance is paid. While the authors find 
immediate increases in male employment, that fades over time, owing to the reform, the change 
reduced female labor force participation. In additional analyses on the “unintended” effects of the 
reform, they investigate how the reform affected children who became residents at different stages 
of childhood. Consistent with our results, they find that young adults (18-year-olds in their case) 
opt for contributing to family resources instead of investment in education when faced with the 
trade off.11 
Finally, we should stress that our estimates capture the effects on the outcomes of aid eligibility 
rather than aid receipt. That is, we are estimating an intention-to-treat effect. We see this as the 
relevant policy measure, since policymakers may decide upon the offer of aid but not take-up. 
Moreover, the intention-to-treat effect is not confounded by potentially endogenous take-up of aid. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the historical background; Section 3 
describes the data, samples, and main variables; Section 4 presents the empirical framework and 
Section 5 includes the analyses and results. We conclude in Section 6.  
 
2. Historical Background 
2.1  General Background 
 
                                                          
10 LoPalo (2019) analyzes the effects of cash aid paid to refugees as part of the United States’ refugee resettlement 
program. She finds that cash aid increases wages for the employed but does not alter employment. The highly educated 
saw the largest wage effect. 
11 We also build on scholarship that analyzed the same historical setting that we use. The GDR refugees we focus on 
are the foundation of the social ties between East and West Germans analyzed by Burchardi and Hassan (2013) and 
Dorner et al. (2016) in the context of German reunification. Lüttinger (1986, 1989) provides a detailed descriptive 
comparison of native West Germans, people expelled from Central and Eastern Europe, and GDR refugees, finding 
that qualification levels and occupational status were higher among GDR refugees. Also related are studies on expellees 
from Central and Eastern European countries, groups that have received more attention in the economic literature than 
the GDR refugees. Falck, Helbich, and Link (2012) find that the expellees did worse in the labor market than West 
German natives, and Bauer, Braun, and Kvasnicka (2013) find that they experienced economic penalties (except for 
those who moved from agriculture into other sectors). Braun and Kvasnicka (2014) analyze the effect on sectoral 
change and productivity, while Braun and Mahmoud (2014) show that the influx of expellees decreased native 
employment in the short term. Note, however, that the influx of expellees from Central and Eastern European countries 
to West Germany was completed before 1950, whereas the influx of GDR refugees had its peak after 1950 and 
continued until the Berlin wall was built in 1961. 
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After the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, the Potsdam Treaty divided the remaining German 
territory west of the Oder-Neisse line into four occupation zones under the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. In 1949, the Soviet Occupation Zone in the east of 
Germany became the German Democratic Republic (GDR), organized as a communist state with 
a planned economy. The three other zones in the west became the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), founded as a democracy with a market economy.  
Even though there was no free movement between the different occupation zones, the 
authorities could not prevent the mass migration from the East to the West that we focus on in this 
paper. Between 1944 and 1961, at least 3.6 million refugees (Flüchtlinge or Zuwanderer in 
German) from East Germany are estimated to have arrived in West Germany.12 This stream of East 
Germans to West Germany is depicted in Figure 1, together with the migration between East and 
West Germany until 2015. At the height of the outflow in 1954, for example, 400,000 East Germans 
fled to the West. The historical migration from East to West is even more important than the 
migration experience after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.13 To get a sense of the magnitude, 
the West German population was 39 million in 1939 (thus, the GDR refugees represented 9 percent 
of the West German population at the time) and the East German population was 17 million in 1939 
(i.e. an estimated 21 percent of the East German population fled between 1944 and 1961).14 
The historical literature names three main drivers that pushed people to flee the GDR (see, for 
example, Heidemeyer, 1994, and Van Melis, 2006). One group of refugees were regime opponents 
who fled for directly political reasons. These included members of the Protestant church youth 
organization, the so-called Junge Gemeinde (Young Parish), which was oppressed by the 
communist regime. These also include people forced to work in uranium mining or for the East 
German police.  
A second driver was the centrally planned communist system’s economic oppression and 
downgrading. Farmers and agricultural workers, for example, fled because of the expropriation and 
reorganization of their farms for use as agricultural production cooperatives, corresponding to 
                                                          
12 This estimate is based on the Census of 1961. It excludes all expellees from Eastern Europe who moved to West 
Germany via the GDR. If Eastern European expellees who left the GDR between 1950 and 1961 (and likely did so 
because of the communist regime) are included, the estimated number of refugees increases to 4.5 million. (Authors’ 
compilation is based on Heidemeyer 1994, pp. 43ff). Based on the 1971 census data we use, the estimated number of 
GDR refugees is about 3.4 million.  
13 Hunt (2006), Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2009), and Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2019) focus on East-West 
migration after 1989. 
14 These population figures refer to the territories of the later FRG and GDR, respectively; see Federal Statistical Office 
(1952, p. 12) and Governmental Central Office for Statistics (1955, p. 8). 
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Soviet kolkhoz. Expropriations also affected owners of industrial firms. Shopkeepers and self-
employed skilled trades workers faced discriminatory taxation and restricted access to markets for 
inputs. The academic elite and technical specialists left because their children were blocked from 
higher education and from freely choosing their occupations.  
More general circumstances, including shortages of goods and limited housing opportunities, 
prompted the third group of refugees to leave the GDR. Reunification with family members in the 
West was also a reason.15  
From today’s perspective, persons who left the GDR and moved to West Germany can, in large 
part, be viewed as refugees. Had the regime been a different one, they would have stayed. They felt 
forced to flee the GDR, escaping secretly and illegally, while leaving behind most of their 
belongings, their property, and their social network. They risked monetary penalties and 
imprisonment, and they exposed family members left behind to punishment. In addition, upon 
arrival in West Germany, GDR refugees were first confined to refugee camps, from which they 
were then allocated to the different West German regions (Kimmel, 2005, Van Melis, 2006, and 
Limbach, 2011). While during the years immediately following the war there were no common 
procedures for refugee management in the different occupation zones, over time the process 
became more and more harmonized and standardized across West Germany, with the Emergency 
Reception Procedures (Notaufnahmegesetz) becoming the FRG-wide legal basis beginning in 
September 1950, to June 1990. Figure 2 includes a schematic overview of the screening and 
examination process the Emergency Reception Procedures involved.16 
Starting in 1952, the communist regime stepped up efforts to deter migration. It established a 
very effective 5-kilometer-wide exclusion zone along the more than 1,000-kilometer-long border 
between West and East Germany, which was heavily fortified and patrolled by armed police. As a 
result, refugees had to cross into West Berlin via train after 1952. Before being allocated to the 
different West German regions (and flown there by plane), they lived in a refugee camp in West 
                                                          
15 GDR refugees also included a group of spies and criminals which, despite its small size, received considerable 
attention in the West German debate (ibid, see also Ackermann, 1995). 
16 All refugees were first hosted in refugee camps, rigorously interrogated by both West German authorities and by the 
Allies (represented in general by members of the different countries’ intelligence institutions). The whole screening 
process took several weeks, and all refugees had to go through it. At the end, there was a committee with three members 
who took all stages of the screening process into account when summarizing the escape motives and making the 
decision about the legal status of the refugees. We are thus comparing two groups of people who – by fleeing the GDR 
– have both strongly indicated that they want to build a new life in West Germany permanently. That is, both groups 
had a strong incentive to be legally acknowledged, independently from the additional refugee-targeted aid. While the 
application for government aid was nominally voluntary, once refugees had gone through the screening process, it was 
largely a minor formality. 
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Berlin, where they were registered, examined and interrogated. In 1961, that final path to the West 
was ultimately blocked by the erection of the Berlin Wall (see, for example, Van Melis, 2006). 
Migration to West Germany was not possible again for 28 years, when the Berlin Wall fell and 
communism collapsed. 
 
2.2  State of the West German Economy and the Welfare State 
 
From the end of World War II through the beginning of the 1970s, West German society was 
shaped by two phenomena. The first was the exceptional GDP growth in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Between 1950 and 1960, annual GDP increased by 127 percent; between 1960 and 1970, it grew 
another 53 percent (Lampert and Althammer 2001, p. 88). West Germany was able to overcome 
the hardship of the immediate years after 1945 relatively fast so that increased real incomes were 
spread throughout the population and inflation rates were stable and moderate. By the end of the 
1950s, West Germany had achieved full employment (Schulz 2005a, Löffler 2007). This implies 
that the socio-economic integration of GDR refugees in the 1950s and 1960s occurred against the 
backdrop of particularly favorable economic landscape.  
The second phenomenon was the key societal challenge brought by unemployment, housing 
shortages, the mass in-migration of expellees and GDR refugees, and the re-integration of war 
victims. The policy response in the immediate years after the war included food stamps, massive 
investments in social housing programs and, as we explain in more detail in the next sections, 
programs targeting expellees and GDR refugees (Schulz 2005a, Löffler 2007).  
West Germany was organized as a social market economy that combined liberal (but regulated) 
markets with a comprehensive welfare state supported by two pillars (Esping-Andersen 1990): the 
social security system and welfare benefits. The social security system includes mandatory health, 
accident, pension, and unemployment insurance schemes. Social security coverage is tied to 
employment and co-financed by employers and employees. Contributions are determined as a 
function of employees’ wages, and benefits depend on prior contributions (Schulz 2005b). Welfare 
benefits, the second pillar, are paid to individuals or families in need who are otherwise uninsured 
and do not have sufficient personal financial means. Welfare benefits are funded through taxes and 
include a monthly allowance that covers basic needs. Although the monthly allowance previously 
existed, it became an enforceable right only in 1962, the same year that welfare benefits were 
10 
 
introduced for persons experiencing illness, depending on care, or facing other difficult 
circumstances (Boldorf 2007).  
At that time, the male breadwinner model was the norm in West Germany and almost all men 
of working age worked. Married women—especially mothers—tended to be housewives who 
relied on their husbands’ incomes. Female employment increased only gradually. Among married 
women below the age of 65, only 26 percent of women worked outside the home in 1950. By 1961, 
that figure rose to 37 percent; in 1970, it was 41 percent (Schulz 2005b, p. 43). With social security 
coverage tied to employment, West German housewives were disadvantaged. 17  To partially 
compensate for this gender inequality and to fight poverty among families with many children, 
child benefits were introduced in 1955. 18  These benefits came in tandem with income tax 
deductions for families (Münch 2005, 2007). 
All refugees from the GDR had access to social security and welfare benefits, irrespective of 
legal status. In 1953, they were integrated into the West German health, accident, and pension 
insurance schemes and, in 1956, into the unemployment insurance scheme. They were also entitled 
to child benefits and family tax deductions (Nahm 1967, p. 8).  
 
2.3  Criteria Determining GDR Refugees’ Eligibility for Additional Benefits 
 
Beyond the social security and welfare benefits, large-scale redistribution schemes were 
implemented in West Germany to partially compensate those who incurred losses during World 
War II. From the early 1950s through 1966, some 63 billion Deutsche Mark were redistributed 
under the Equalization of Burdens Act. This remains one of the biggest economic and financial 
transactions in German history, with roughly 25 percent of the 1966 GDP redistributed over about 
15 years.19 Funding came through designated taxes (Nahm 1967, p. 20; Abelshauser 2011, p. 335).   
There was a broad political consensus that expellees from Eastern and Central Europe should 
benefit from the redistribution programs (Werber, Borde, and Ehrenforth 1954; Heidemeyer 1994). 
The question whether GDR refugees should also benefit sparked a major and controversial political 
                                                          
17 Women and children are, however, entitled to health insurance through their husbands’ or fathers’ insurance. Within 
the pension insurance scheme, widows receive surviving dependents’ pensions.  
18 Child benefits were paid per child from the third child onward and, after 1961, from the second child onward. From 
1955 through 1965, the child benefits were raised multiple times. In principle, the benefits were designed at a flat-rate, 
but they were reduced for families with incomes exceeding a certain threshold. Initially, the child benefits were 
financed by employers and the self-employed. In later years, they were funded through taxes (Münch 2005, 2007).  
19 West German annual GDP in 1966 was 249 billion Deutsche Mark. The figures cited here are in 1966 prices.  
11 
 
debate. Until the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, the debate revolved around the question of whether 
East Germans were genuine refugees, as discussed before. In this context, influential members of 
the governing Christian Democratic Party opposed the inclusion of GDR refugees in the 
redistribution programs. Their underlying motive was to discourage further migration from East 
Germany, although program costs were also a consideration (Heidemeyer 1994, Ackermann 
1995).20  
In the end, only a subgroup of East German migrants was given status on par with the expellees 
and made eligible for financial and other aid that addressed their specific needs as refugees. And 
that was true only from 1953 forward. Those “political GDR refugees” received so-called “C-
status” that was documented in their passports, and that is the legal background of the government 
aid we analyze here.21 C-status was decided in refugee offices at the regional level. Refugees who 
migrated before 1953 could apply retroactively. Children were automatically assigned the same 
status as their parents (Werber et al. 1954, Ackermann 1995). 
 
2.4  Benefits for Political GDR-Refugees 
 
As noted earlier, GDR migrants who were acknowledged as political refugees became eligible 
for an additional set of governmental programs (Lüder 1957; for an overview see Appendix Table 
A.1), including cash benefits and access to loans. Lump-sum cash benefits were paid for the 
purchase of household goods and personal effects that might have been lost. A monthly cash 
allowance was extended to refugees and their relatives who wanted to complete a vocational 
qualification or university degree but lacked the financial means. Loans, meanwhile, were provided 
for the purchase of real estate used for private purposes and for professionals, farmers, and business 
owners who had lost their capital. Rent-controlled apartments were available through yet another 
program.22 There also existed the possibility of a publicly subsidized job (Lüder 1957, Nahm 
1967). Indeed, various measures were intended to boost the refugees’ labor market integration. 
Among the target groups were farmers or agricultural workers (via affordable loans and cash 
benefits), the self-employed (via affordable loans, debt guarantees, co-partnerships, tax cuts, cash 
                                                          
20 The parliamentary opposition, the Social Democrats, advocated a more liberal response to the refugee inflow but 
lacked the political power to put it into action.  
21 The specific law is the Federal Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz, BVFG) of 1953. 
22  Two laws formed the basis for the benefits, the Hardship Fund of the Equalization of Burdens Act 
(Lastenausgleichsgesetz, LAG) and the Federal Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz, BVFG). Until 1966, 2.5 
billion Deutsche Mark were distributed under the Hardship Fund (Nahm 1967, p. 32). 
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benefits, and other privileges), and employees (via privileged treatment by employment agencies, 
privileged re-entry into previous occupations, and privileged access to apprenticeships).  
In other words, the refugee-specific aid granted political refugees access to the social security 
and welfare system of the FRG while also making them eligible for additional programs that aimed 
to provide partial compensation for the losses they had incurred. Most components of the refugee-
specific aid alleviated current needs and would not be characterized as direct investments in refugee 
children. However, there is one important exception: student allowances. Student allowances may 
allow young adults who face trade-offs between investing in human capital and starting to work to 
overcome the financial constraints that limit their ability to invest. Overall, and in contrast with 
children, young adults might be more vulnerable to an absence of refugee-specific government aid 
since, again, they are less naturally linked to the educational institutions of the host country. 
Economic necessity combined with a lack of government assistance may preclude these young 
adult refugees from pursuing higher education, which might have been beneficial for their long-
term well-being.  
Policymakers sought to improve the refugees’ socio-economic status while moving toward 
equality of opportunities between refugees and West German natives (Werber et al. 1954, 
Heidemeyer 1994). Accordingly, eligibility for benefits ended once the individual recipients 
reached a sufficient degree of social and economic integration. East German migrants who were 
not acknowledged as political refugees were excluded from these comprehensive programs, 
although they still were eligible for the social insurance and welfare benefits available to the 
population broadly. 
The additional benefits paid to political refugees were economically significant. For example, 
adolescents and young adults willing to tolerate modest living standards were able to be full-time 
university students or apprentices thanks to the monthly education or vocational training allowance 
(Gillner 1955).   
 
2.5  West German Educational System 
 
Primary, secondary, and tertiary education is generally free of charge in Germany, implying 
that there is no tuition. In the time span relevant to our study, compulsory schooling covered eight 
years in a system that had three school “tracks:” the lowest track that ended after eighth grade (and 
encompassed the majority of students), an intermediate track to which student switched after fourth 
13 
 
grade, and the college-bound Gymnasium track. In the early years of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, few students (3.3 percent in 1951) moved to the intermediate school track or to the 
highest school track, the Gymnasium, which qualified students for direct university admission. In 
1959, the Gymnasium track was chosen by 9.7 percent of students; the fast majority attended the 
lowest school track. In the years that followed, enrollment in the intermediate and Gymnasium 
tracks rose (Schulz 2005a, p. 60).  
As part of this general expansion in education, a national student-aid program was introduced 
in the winter term of 1957/58. Students with good academic records but without the financial means 
to attend university were paid a monthly education allowance so they could study. Half of the 
allowance was stipend-based, and half was financed through student loans (Anweiler 2005). In 
1971, the year when our data were sampled, 14.2 percent of West German men aged 20 to 50 had 
obtained a university degree, 63.7 an apprenticeship degree, and 22.0 percent had no formal 
qualification. The corresponding shares for women are 7.8 percent (university graduates), 43.2 
percent (women with completed apprenticeship training), and 49.0 percent (no formal 
qualification).23   
 
3. Data, Sample, and Definition of Main Variables 
3.1  Data 
Our analysis is based on the Supplementary Microcensus of 1971, the so-called 
Mikrozensuszusatzerhebung (MZU 1971), conducted by the German Federal Statistical Office in 
April 1971. It is a 1 percent representative sample of the West German native population aged 15 
and older, and its aim was to elicit information on economic and social transformations in post-war 
Germany. Respondents were required by law to participate in the survey (for a detailed description, 
see Tegtmeyer 1979). 
     For the purposes of our study, the MZU 1971 has three major advantages. First, these data 
contain information on a person’s region of origin and population group, allowing us to identify 
refugees from the GDR. We also know their age at arrival and the year of arrival in the West, and 
we can see whether former GDR citizens were eligible for government aid. A second advantage of 
the data is its detailed parental background characteristics for refugees at age 15. This information, 
collected for all persons born in 1920 or later, includes the father’s detailed occupational status (13 
                                                          
23 Authors’ estimates based on the data described in Section 3.   
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categories), the father’s industry (16 categories), the father’s education level (6 categories), and the 
mother’s education level (6 categories).24 They were the most important characteristics used in 
distinguishing political refugees from economic refugees. The third advantage is that the data 
provide detailed information on individuals’ socio-economic outcomes in 1971. These variables 
refer to a person’s education, employment, type of employment, and income. Overall, the MZU 
1971 is an ideal data source for studying the impact of governmental support programs on child 
and young adult refugees’ economic success.  
The MZU 1971 has a clustered survey design. Throughout the analysis, we account for a potential 
dependence of observations within the same sampling units by clustering our standard errors 
accordingly.25  
 
3.2  Sample 
Our analysis focuses on refugees from East Germany who migrated to West Germany before the 
Berlin wall was built in 1961.26 We begin with individuals migrating from 1946; bypassing 1945, 
which was marked by the turmoil and chaos of the end of the war.  Our goal is an examination of 
outcomes that capture refugees’ economic success in 1971. Since the male breadwinner model 
dominated in West Germany and women—especially mothers—dropped out of the labor force, 
there are clear gender differences in outcomes in 1971. Indeed, only 50 percent of East German 
women who migrated as young adults (at ages 15 to 24) and 55 percent of women who migrated 
                                                          
24 The survey also includes mothers’ occupational status and industry at age 15. However, in many cases mothers 
dropped out of the labor force and this information is either missing or not very meaningful. Therefore, we focus on 
fathers’ occupational status and industry. The occupational status variable is influenced by Max Weber’s concept of 
social stratification (Lüttinger 1989, p. 73). On the one hand, the variable divides occupational status into horizontal 
categories (for example, by distinguishing among the self-employed, the employed, civil servants, workers, etc.). On 
the other hand, the variable elicits status differences within these categories (for example, by distinguishing among 
low, medium, and high-level civil employees). Because this status variable is crucial for our analysis, our main sample 
excludes 5,545 East German refugees for which the father’s occupation status was missing. We return to this restriction 
later when we assess the robustness of our results. 
25 In the first sampling stage, 10 percent of all sampling districts were randomly selected. In the second stage, 10 
percent of the population aged 15 and older was randomly selected within the sampled districts. Since sampling districts 
were relatively small, there are several hundred clusters (for details see Schimpl-Neimanns, 2016). 
26 We exclude former expellees from Eastern European territories who arrived in West Germany via East Germany. 
These former expellees form a distinct group that was forced to migrate twice and, hence, was entitled to more 
governmental support programs than East German refugees who migrated only once. By only including persons living 
at their main residence, we also impose restrictions that make our sample representative. Furthermore, we exclude 
observations classified as supplemental and duplicated observations (for details see Schimpl-Neimanns, 2016). 
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as children (at ages 1 to 15) were employed in 1971 (Table1).27 Because of these differences, we 
present results separately for men and women.  
     Since the economic success of migrants likely depends on the age at which a refugee arrives in 
the country of destination, we additionally focus our analysis on two main samples. The sample 
definitions and the historical timeline are summarized in Figure 3. We call our samples the children 
sample and the youth sample (=young adults). The children sample consists of refugees who 
arrived in West Germany at ages 1 to 14, at an age in which they were subject to compulsory school 
attendance.28Therefore, the children sample comprises first generation migrants who arrived in the 
destination country before they left high school. We exclude those who arrived below age 1 to 
ensure that they were born in the GDR and did in fact flee.  
The youth sample, meanwhile, includes refugees who migrated between the ages 15 to 24 and, 
because of their age at arrival in West Germany, were not required to attend school. They had to 
decide whether to continue going to school, pursue an apprenticeship degree, attend university, or 
immediately search for a job. In this sense, their integration in the host-country was distinct from 
the integration of their counterparts from the children sample.  
Finally, we show results for the refugees who reflect the “parent” generation, i.e. refugees who 
migrated at ages 25-51 (the adult sample). This is instructive to indicate that our main findings are 
not the result of potential selection effects that our identification strategy is unable to capture.  
 
3.3  Outcome Variables 
To capture medium-term outcomes of refugee children and young adults in 1971, we focus on two 
sets of outcome variables. First, we examine variables capturing educational attainment; as 
described earlier, the education allowance was a significant component of the refugee aid program 
targeting refugees migrating at young ages. Specifically, we assess how refugee-specific aid 
impacted the likelihood of obtaining a high qualification (i.e., graduating from university), a 
medium qualification (i.e., completing an apprenticeship training degree), or a low qualification 
(i.e., not obtaining a formal qualification).  
     Second, we also look at employment outcomes, including an indicator variable for being 
employed and a variable capturing job quality. The latter is an indicator variable if a person is 
                                                          
27 One consequence of the low female employment rates was that significant shares of women did not report important 
economic indicators like their income.   
28 School was mandatory through eighth grade, when students were typically 15 years old. 
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employed as a high-level civil servant, high-level employee, or elite worker (i.e., a worker with 
managerial responsibilities). Finally, we assess home ownership as well as individuals’ total 
monthly net income from all income sources, which are proxy variables for socio-economic status.  
In Table 1, we report summary statistics for our sample and separately by gender. About 41 
percent of our overall sample belongs to the youth sample and about 30 percent to the children 
sample. In both these samples, females account for close to 50 percent of the observations, whereas 
women account for about 60 percent in the adult sample. Among refugees arriving as young adults 
(children), 21 (34) percent of males were eligible for government aid compared to 18 (25) percent 
of females. The average age of the children sample is 26 in 1971 and 38 for the youth sample. Table 
1 also displays summary statistics of the outcome variables that we analyze in the following section.  
 
4. Empirical Specifications and Identification Strategy 
4.1 Main specification 
We are interested in the causal effect of aid-eligibility on refugee children and young adults’ 
economic success later in life. Effect identification is complicated by the fact that those eligible for 
aid are both self-selected and screened by the local authorities. We therefore combine three 
strategies. First, we restrict our focus to GDR refugees who all applied to be legally acknowledged, 
so when we compare those who applied and were successfully with those who weren’t, we are able 
to “difference out” the effect of fleeing the GDR, as both treatment and control groups did. Then, 
applicants were thoroughly screened, in a specific refugee screening process that involved West 
German authorities and those of the Allied countries. When comparing GDR refugees eligible for 
aid and their non-eligible applicant counterparts, we are able to control for the most important 
characteristics that the local authorities used to select aid-eligible persons from the pool of 
applicants, namely detailed parental background characteristics. This allows us to reduce the 
selection bias introduced by the screening process of the authorities.  
We also take advantage of the fact that the refugee-targeted aid was only available after 1953. 
This generates an additional source of variation in exposure to aid. Indeed, those aid-eligible 
refugees who arrived in 1953 and later became eligible for aid immediately after their arrival in 
West Germany and at a younger average age. In contrast, those arriving before 1953 became aid-
eligible only ex post and at an older average age, when important decisions concerning integration 
had already been taken. The a priori expectation is thus that any positive effects of aid eligibility 
are more pronounced for the group arriving in 1953 and after.  
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Third, we use a second comparison group that the specific historical context provides us, 
namely the native West Germans. We do so employing inverse probability weighting where we 
assign weights to the observations in the West German sample. A within-GDR refugee comparison 
between aid-eligible and non-eligible individuals hinges on the assumption that systematic 
differences between the two groups are constant over time. However, during the time-period that 
we study, West Germany underwent rapid economic growth and structural changes, including for 
example a shift in employment away from agriculture towards industry.29 As explained earlier, our 
treatment group of aid-eligible refugees and our control group of non-eligible refugees differ in the 
sectoral composition of employment, and therefore might be differentially affected by those 
structural changes.  Introducing native West Germans using a triple differences-in-differences 
allows us to remove such potentially confounding trends. Additionally, it allows us to assess how 
the offspring of refugees overall fared in 1971 relative to comparable native West Germans. 
 
Against this background, our empirical specification is as follows:   
 
(1)   𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾4𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾5𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 + 𝛾𝛾6𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖. 
 
Yi captures medium-term economic outcomes of refugees measured in 1971 such as education 
outcomes, employment outcomes, home ownership and income. As discussed earlier, because age-
at-arrival determines the integration of young refugees into the West German education system, we 
separately estimate equation (1) for two different groups of GDR refugees, those arriving as 
children (at ages 1 to 14) and those arriving as young adults (at ages 15 to 24).  
The variable GDRi is equal to one for refugees from East Germany, and zero for native West 
Germans. The variable AIDi is a dummy variable indicating refugees’ eligibility for government 
aid at any point after arrival, Ti is a dummy variable for having arrived in West Germany in 1953, 
or later, and AIDi * Ti is an interaction term indicating GDR refugees who were eligible for aid and 
arrived in 1953, or thereafter.  
The coefficient 𝛾𝛾1 represents the mean differences in Yi between East German refugees and 
native West Germans. 𝛾𝛾1 can thus be interpreted as an indication of the degree of the overall socio-
                                                          
29 Bauer et al. (2013), for example, find that the offspring of expellees who were farmers improved their socio-
economic status more than the offspring of other expellee groups. For related results for Finland, see Sarvimäki et al. 
2019.  
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economic integration of GDR refugees who arrived as kids or young adults vis-à-vis- their West 
German counterparts. 𝛾𝛾2 captures the mean difference in outcomes between aid-eligible refugees 
and non-eligible refugees, 𝛾𝛾3 indicates the mean difference in outcomes for those refugees who 
arrived in West Germany in 1953 or thereafter and those who arrived before 1953. Finally, 𝛾𝛾4 
reflects the mean difference in outcomes for aid-eligible refugees who arrived after 1953 (the 
difference-in-difference-in-differences estimate). 
This specification reflects the basic institutional details of the government aid program that we 
analyze. The program was introduced in 1953, which rationalizes the separation of those who 
arrived before 1953, and those who arrived thereafter. At the same time, refugees who arrived 
before 1953 and who were acknowledged as legal refugees were eligible for aid, that is AIDi has 
values of one for refugees arriving between 1946 and 1961. Note as well that those who arrived 
before 1953 went through the recognition process without knowing that the refugee-specific aid 
program will eventually be introduced. 
Conceptionally, we differentiate the effects of those who became aid eligible immediately after 
arrival (Ti=1), from those who arrived in the same “age-at-arrival” range but became eligible later 
(i.e. when they were older, Ti=0). For example, refugee children who were below 15 at arrival in 
West Germany and arrived before 1953 were on average 11.8 years old in 1953, when the refugee-
targeted aid was introduced. The counterpart of children who were also below 15 at arrival, but 
arrived in 1953, or later, were 4.2 years old on average when their parents became eligible for the 
refugee-specific aid (note that the average age at arrival for children who arrived below the age of 
15, was 7.6 for both those who arrive before 1953 and those who arrived thereafter). 
Analogously, young adults who were between 15 and 24 at arrival and arrived before 1953 
were on average 24.3 years old in 1953, when the refugee-targeted aid was introduced, whereas 
those who arrived in 1953, or later, were on average 19.9 years old when they became eligible 
(even though those who arrived before 1953 and those who arrived thereafter were about 20 years 
old, on average). 
In the basic specification, we address the age difference in two ways. First, the inclusion of Ti 
captures level differences in the outcome variable between the early and late arrivals and picks up 
unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity between the two groups (𝛾𝛾3). 𝛾𝛾4 captures differences 
in outcomes that arise because of differences in age when refugees became eligible for aid, and 
differences related to whether they became eligible immediately after arrival or merely ex post. We 
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further take the age difference into account by controlling for the age of individuals in 1971. 
Specifically, Xibasic includes age in 1971 and its square.30  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝includes the refugees’ parents background characteristics, the most important observable 
characteristics that the West German authorities used to screen the refugees, which allow us to 
reduce selection bias introduced by the screening process of the authorities. As described earlier, 
they focused on background characteristics of the adults in a family as those were the characteristics 
that the GDR regime used to identify potential “class enemies”. Thus, both East and West German 
authorities used the same “profiling” characteristics to predict likely political refugees (who 
became eligible for government aid) as opposed to likely economic refugee (who did not become 
eligible for government aid). The advantage of our data is that we observe parental background 
characteristics when the refugee children and young adults were 15 years old, among them the 
father’s occupational status (13 categories), father’s industry (16 categories), and father and 
mother’s qualification levels (6 categories, respectively). Of course, those characteristics are 
important control variables by themselves, given our outcome variables. For the young adult 
sample, the information on industry and occupational status reflects what the parents were doing 
in the GDR, whereas for the children sample, the information revers to what parents were doing in 
the FRG. 
In our main specification, we treat AIDi as a dummy variable. But the institutional set up of our 
experiment allows us to go one step further and use differences in treatment dose as the identifying 
variation. The coefficient on the dummy variable specification represents a weighted average of 
the per-unit causal effect along the length of the causal response function. Indeed, there is large 
variation in the number of potential years of aid-eligibility, which we exploit in an additional 
specification.  
When constructing the treatment dose measure, we create a variable capturing potential years 
of exposure (𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) and estimate equation (1) above, but replace AIDi by 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖. Specifically, 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 
is defined as follows: 
 
 
                                                          
30 Note that we also used specifications that include age-dummies. Our results are robust to this change in 
specification. 
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That is, for those who are not eligible, EXPi is still zero. However, for those who arrived after 
the introduction of the refugee-targeted government aid in 1953, the potential number of years of 
eligibility is 1971 (the year of the survey and in which we measure our outcomes) minus the year 
of arrival (yearmigri) in West Germany. For those who arrived before 1953, aid-eligibility only 
started after 1953 when they had already lived in West Germany for a couple of years and were 
older compared to their age-at-arrival cohort that arrived in 1953, or later (see the example above 
when we discuss the role of Ti). While aid-eligibility did not start for this group immediately after 
arrival in West Germany, it potentially lasted for 18 years, from 1953 to 1971.  
Overall, we find considerable variation in treatment dose. As Table 1 shows, in the children 
sample, the average potential years of exposure is 5.3 (std. dev. 7.7) for males and 3.9 (std. dev. 
6.9) for females; in the young adult sample, it is 3.2 (std. dev. 6.4) for males and 2.7 (std. dev. 6.0) 
for females. Table 2 shows further details of this variable for males, both unconditionally (A) and 
conditionally on aid-eligibility (B). As is clear from those statistics, those who arrived earlier had 
more years of potential aid-eligibility but became eligible when they were older.31 
 
4.2 Balancing Tests 
We first examine whether there are systematic differences between GDR refugees across age-
at-arrival and year of arrival. To do so, we show empirical evidence that suggests that there is no 
systematic difference between the key observable characteristics of those who arrived before 
1953—when neither the refugees nor people involved in the screening process knew that the 
refugee-targeted government aid program would be introduced—and those who arrived in 1953 or 
later. 
  In terms of age-at-arrival, one concern might be that refugee families tried to manipulate 
their aid eligibility status or that the authorities who screened the refugee families systematically 
treated families with kids in certain age ranges differently; perhaps, because the access to student 
allowances was important at the time for the family. Had there been strategic sorting based on age 
                                                          
31 The statistics look very similar for females and can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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at arrival, we would expect to observe changes in age at arrival by refugee status and over time. 
This is clearly not the case. Table 3 shows mean age at arrival for both the children and youth 
samples. Furthermore, we distinguish between “before 1953”, the time before the refugee-specific 
aid was implemented and before invested parties new about it, and 1953 onward. For male refugees 
of the children sample who received aid, the mean age at arrival before 1953 was 7.6 years (column 
1(A)). It was virtually the same—7.7 years—for those arriving in 1953 and later. Moreover, the 
age of arrival for those not receiving aid was not statistically different (columns 2, 3, and 4 (A)). 
The same applies to male refugees arriving as young adults. Before 1953, the mean age at arrival 
for those receiving aid was 19.8 (column 5(A)), while it was 19.9 from 1953 onward. Again, the 
mean age at arrival for those not receiving aid was not statistically different (column 6, 7, and 8 
(A)). There is no evidence for strategic sorting into aid based on the age of female refugee children 
and young adults, either, as shown in the analogous columns for females in Panel B. 
     Similarly, we assess whether from 1953 onward there was strategic sorting into the program 
based on fathers’ educational attainment. One concern might be that highly educated families were 
more likely to select or be screened into aid eligibility, as the children of these families planned to 
attend university. Moving through the table in the same way as we did for “age at arrival”, there 
are no such systematic differences for the group of male refugees. Only one difference is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level: Fathers of refugee children who were aid-eligible 
and arrived before 1953 were more likely to have no formal qualification level, suggesting that, if 
anything, there was negative selection into aid-eligibility based on fathers’ educational attainment. 
Estimates for the sample of aid eligible women, however, suggest that their fathers were somewhat 
more likely to have a high qualification level. Yet as we see below, this was not associated with 
better socio-economic outcomes for their daughters.  
We also provide balancing tests based on the occupational status of the father, separately for 
men (Table 4) and women (Table 5).32 The comparison yields two insights. First, in line with our 
expectations, there are systematic differences between aid eligible and non-eligible refugees. The 
fathers of aid eligible refugees are on average more likely to have worked as farmers, self-
employed, and high-level civil servants. Conversely, the fathers of aid eligible refugees are 
underrepresented among the “worker” and “qualified worker”-categories. Second, these patterns 
are not necessarily constant between refugees arriving before and after 1953. Especially with regard 
                                                          
32 Note again that this information reflects the industry/occupation in which parents worked when respondents were 
15 years old, that is, the “parents” of the children sample were already in the FRG. 
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to self-employed fathers, the difference by aid eligibility are more pronounced for the refugees 
arriving in later years. This is consistent with the fact that the oppression of craftsman and certain 
professional persons such as doctors and lawyers intensified after 1957 in the GDR (see Van Melis, 
2006). The two insights thus show the importance of controlling for fathers’ detailed occupational 
status and industry as well as for arrival before and after 1953 as part of our triple DID strategy. 
As already mentioned, we use inverse-probability weighting in our triple differences-in-
differences estimations. Table 6 shows a detailed comparison of GDR refugees with native West 
Germans both before inverse-probability weighting and thereafter. 
 
5. Results 
5.1  Results for Men 
Table 7 displays the effect of refugee-specific government aid for men. Each column refers to 
a different outcome variable and the effects are estimated separately for our three samples as 
defined by age of arrival (i.e., the youth, children, and adult samples). The table shows that refugee-
specific aid had economically and statistically significant positive effects on the educational 
attainment and labor market integration of men who arrived as young adults. These effects are 
driven by aid-eligible refugees who arrived in 1953 and later, indicating that it was decisive that 
they received the aid immediately upon arrival in West Germany.  
Aid-eligibility increased the likelihood of obtaining a high-qualification by 16.0 percentage 
points for male individuals belonging to the youth sample who arrived in 1953 and later (column 
(1) in Table 7).  In line with this strong effect on educational attainment, the same group was 17.1 
more likely to have a high-status job in 1971 (column (5)) and their net monthly incomes were 12.8 
percent higher on average (column (7)).33 In contrast, there are no positive effects among male 
refugees who arrived as young adults before 1953 and only became eligible for aid after they had 
lived in West Germany for some time.  
The positive effect on the educational attainment and labor market integration on men who 
arrived as young adults are estimated controlling for detailed parental background characteristics, 
exploiting variation in the exposure to aid, and relying on West German natives as an additional 
control group to purge the estimated coefficients of time-trends induced, for example, by structural 
changes in the labor market. However, one might be concerned that the estimated effects are caused 
                                                          
33 Note that we find no effects on the probability of being employed (column (4)), which results from the fact that 
almost all men in the youth sample – 98 percent – were employed at the time, regardless of aid eligibility (Table 1).  
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by self-selection into aid eligibility that our identification strategy is not able to capture. To address 
this question, it is useful to look at the sample of adults (see again Table 7). These adults arrived in 
West Germany at an age when their educational attainment had already been pre-determined. While 
they were on average more educated than the West Germans, those GDR refugee “parents” who 
were aid-eligible and arrived before 1953 had a higher probability of having medium education, 
while those arriving in 1953, or later, had the higher probability of being low educated. Therefore, 
the aid eligible adult migrants who arrived after 1953 were, if anything, negatively selected in terms 
of their qualification. In addition, for the aid eligible adults, there are no statistically significantly 
differences with regard to the likelihood of having a high qualification, a high status job, and a 
higher income. This is reassuring as it suggests that the results discussed previously for the youth 
sample are not driven by a general tendency of refugees with more favorable characteristics to self-
select into aid eligibility. 
We do find statistically significant differences with regard to homeownership. GDR refugees 
of the “parent” generation are less likely than Native West Germans to own a home, this is less 
pronounced for those who were aid-eligible and arrived before 1953, and more pronounced for 
those who arrived thereafter. 
We next turn to the sample of men who arrived in West Germany as children, when they were 
still subject to compulsory schooling. Interestingly, we find that eligibility for aid did not have any 
positive effects for this sample. This implies that until 1971 those not eligible for aid were able to 
catch up with their aid-eligible counterparts; aid-eligibility had no meaningful impact on their later 
integration in the labor market.  
 
5.2 Results for Women 
Table 8 shows the same analyses for women, introducing the probability of being married and 
the number of children as additional outcome variables capturing family structures. The results 
reveal that aid-eligibility had no effect on women’s outcomes. In fact, none of the coefficients 
discussed previously for men are statistically significant. Why is this the case? An explanation 
rationalizing the absence of positive treatment effects for women is that the West German labor 
market in 1971 was shaped by the male-breadwinner model, with women having a low attachment 
to the labor market. Only roughly half of the women in our three age-at-arrival samples were 
employed in 1971. Additionally, more than 40 percent of these women had not completed at least 
a vocational degree, a share that was significantly lower for their male counterparts (e.g., only 17 
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percent of men in our youth sample were in the same category; see Table 1). The low overall labor 
force attachment seems to have implied that aid eligibility made no difference for the educational 
attainment and labor market integration of female GDR refugees. 
  
5.3 Robustness Checks 
We have conducted a number of tests to check the robustness of our conclusions. In our main 
samples, we dropped respondents who did not report their fathers’ occupational status. To assess 
how this impacts our findings, we replicated our analysis and re-estimated equation (2). This time 
we included all individuals and captured missing occupational status of the fathers by incorporating 
an additional category in our regression analysis.  
 In addition, and because the share of AID-eligible refugees increased after 1957, we test the 
robustness of our results to restricting the sample to the period 1946-1957, instead of 1946-1961 
that we use in the main sample. The results for both exercises are similar to those presented 
earlier.34 
 
5.4  Interpretation 
The divergent results for the two samples are noteworthy. Why do we find positive and 
economically significant effects for the youth sample but reach very different conclusions for the 
children sample? Upon arrival in West Germany, refugees and their families had few resources at 
hand. They were also liquidity constrained. That meant refugees arriving as young adults had to 
consider whether to enter the labor force and immediately earn money. Our results indicate that 
refugee-specific aid made a decisive difference. It enabled young adults to postpone their entry into 
the labor market and, instead, pursue higher education. In the medium-term, this higher education 
was associated with working in a higher-status job and having higher monthly incomes. 
Importantly, male young adults who migrated in 1953 or later drive these results. This indicates 
that the aid was only effective for refugees who received it immediately upon their arrival. 
 For younger male children arriving in West Germany, the economic incentives were 
different. Not only were these refugees too young to start working immediately, but it appears that 
time spent in the destination country allowed those not eligible for aid to catch up with their aid 
eligible counterparts. Presumably, this catch-up process was smoothed by the general expansion of 
                                                          
34 Results are available from the authors.  
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higher education and the exceptional period of economic growth that West Germany experienced. 
We would like to emphasize that we do not view our results as evidence that aid for young children 
would be ineffective in general. After all, in the German context that we analyze, all refugees and 
their children were covered by social security and had access to tuition-free education (Section 2). 
However, the results demonstrate that refugees migrating as children and young adults face 
different challenges which play an important role in shaping medium-term outcomes and deserve 
the attention of policy makers. 
Finally, we do not find any significant effects for women. The West German society and labor 
market of the 1970s was characterized by strong gender disparities. Almost all men of working age 
were employed, whereas women’s labor market attachment was much weaker on average and they 
tended to become housewives once they had their first child. Accordingly, only about half of the 
women in our sample worked in 1971, and they had a significantly higher likelihood than men to 
lack a formal qualification. Against this backdrop, our results indicate that aid eligible women did 
not take up the education grants and hence did not advance their socio-economic integration in the 
same way male young adults did.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines whether refugees’ economic success is linked to government aid. We 
investigate the impact on refugees who migrated as children (at ages 1 to 14) and on refugees who 
migrated as young adults (at ages 15 to 24) and assess medium-term outcomes (i.e., at least 10 
years after migrations). The analysis focuses on GDR refugees who migrated to West Germany 
from the end of World War II until the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. We exploit the fact that West 
German authorities distinguished between political and economic refugees from the GDR, 
providing aid only to political refugees. Receipt of this refugee-specific aid, which was meant to 
compensate for the losses stemming from the refugee experience, did not affect refugees’ ability to 
also receive standard welfare and social security benefits in West Germany. The quasi-
experimental nature of this historical setting allows us to combine several approaches to address 
identification concerns. 
 Refugee-specific aid engendered positive and economically meaningful effects for male 
refugees migrating as young adults. For refugees who migrated as children, we find no similar 
positive effects of the refugee-specific aid on education, employment outcomes, and incomes.  
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We conclude that age-at-arrival and the institutional link to the host country is important. 
Refugees migrating as children are able to catch up with their counterparts who were aid-eligible. 
This catch-up process, presumably, is related to their natural integration in the host countries 
education institutions through compulsory schooling laws, the general expansion of higher 
education and the exceptional period of economic growth that West Germany underwent during 
the period we study. In contrast, refugees migrating as young adults were more vulnerable to a lack 
of immediate refugee-specific aid. Faced with the trade-off between entering the labor market and 
earning income right away or investing in education, those young adults who were not eligible for 
refugee-specific aid bypassed investments in education—not surprising, given their and their 
families’ severe liquidity constraints. This finding suggests that policymakers need to consider the 
specific needs of young refugees who are above the compulsory schooling age.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
27 
 
References 
Aizer, Anna, Shari Eli, Joseph Ferrie and Adriana Lleras-Muney (2016). The Long-Run Impact of Cash 
Transfers to Poor Families. American Economic Review, 106 (4): 935-71. 
Andersen, Lars Højsgaard, Christian Dustmann and Rasmus Landersø (2019). Lowering Welfare 
Benefits: Intended and Unintended Consequences for Migrants and their Families. CReAM 
Discussion Paper Series 1905, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), 
Department of Economics, University College London. 
Abelshauser, Werner (2011). Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. München: 
C.H. Beck. 
Ackermann, Volker (1995). Der „echte“ Flüchtling - Deutsche Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge aus der 
DDR 1945-1961. Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag Rasch. 
Althammer, Jörg and Heinz Lampert (2001), Lehrbuch der Sozialpolitik. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: 
Springer. 
Anweiler, Oskar (2005), Bildungspolitik, in: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Federal 
Archive (Eds), Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, Band 3: Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1949-1957, Baden Baden: Nomos, pp. 653-686.  
Bauer, Thomas, Sebastian Braun, and Michael Kvasnicka (2013). The Economic Integration of Forced 
Migrants: Evidence for Post-War Germany. The Economic Journal 123(571), 889-1024. 
Becker, Sascha O. and Andreas Ferrara (2019). Consequences of forced migration: A survey of recent 
findings. Labour Economics, 59: 1-16.. 
Becker, Sascha O., Irena Grosfeld, Pauline Grosjean, Nico Voigtländer and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 
Forced Migration and Human Capital: Evidence from Post-WWII Population Transfers. The 
American Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Bleakley, Hoyt, and Aimee Chin (2010). Age at Arrival, Engish Proficiency, and Social Assimilation 
among US Immigrants. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1): 165-92. 
Boldorf, Marcel (2007), Sozialpolitische Denk- und Handlungsfelder, in: Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs and the Federal Archive (Eds), Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, Band 
4: Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1957-1966, Baden Baden: Nomos, pp. 85-150. 
Borjas, George J. (2000). Ethnic enclaves and assimilation. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 7: 89–
122. 
Braun, Sebastian and Toman Omar Mahmoud (2014). The Employment Effects of Immigration: 
Evidence from the Mass Arrival of German Expellees in Postwar Germany. Journal of Economic 
History 74(1), 69-109. 
Braun, Sebastian and Michael Kvasnicka (2014). Immigration and Structural Change: Evidence from 
post-war Germany, Journal of International Economics 93(2), 253-269. 
Burchardi, Konrad and Tarek Hassan (2013). The Economic Impact of Social Ties. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 128(3). 1219-1271. 
Cameron, Colin and Pravin Trivedi (2010). Microeconometrics Using Stata. College Station, Texas: 
Stata Press. 
28 
 
Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, and Jonah Rockoff (2011). New evidence on the long-term impacts of 
tax credits. IRS Statistics of Income White Paper. 
Chetty, Ray and Nathaniel Hendren (2018). The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational 
Mobility I: Childhood Exposure Effects. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 133(3), 1107-1162. 
Chetty, Raj, Nathaniel Hendren, and Lawrence Katz (2016). The Effects of Exposure to Better 
Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment. 
American Economic Review, 106(4), 855-902. 
Cortes, Kalena E. (2004). Are refugees different from economic immigrants? Some empirical evidence 
on the heterogeneity of immigrant groups in the United States. Review of Economics and Statistics, 
86(2): 465–480. 
Dahl, Gordon and Lance Lochner (2012). The Impact of Family Income on Child Achievement: 
Evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit, American Economic Review, 102(5), 1927-1956.  
Damm, Anna Piil (2009). Ethnic Enclaves and Immigrant Labor Market Outcomes: Quasi-
Experimental Evidence. Journal of Labor Economics. 27(2), 281-314. 
Dustmann, Christian, Francesco Fasani, Tommaso Frattini, Luigi Minale and Uta Schönberg (2017). 
On the economics and politics of refugee migration. Economic policy, 32(91), 497-550 
Deaton, Angus (1997). The Analysis of Household Surveys. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Del Boca, Daniela, Christopher Flinn, and Matthew Wiswall (2016), Transfers to Households with 
Children and Child Development, The Economic Journal, 126(596), 136-183. 
Dorner, Matthias, Dietmar Harhoff, Tina Hinz, Karin Hoisl, and Stefan Bender (2016). Social Ties for 
Labor Market Access – Lessons from the migration of East German Inventors, IAB-Discussion 
Paper 41/2016.  
Edin, Per-Anders, Peter Fredriksson, and Olof Åslund (2003). Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic 
Success of Immigrants - Evidence from a Natural Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
118(1), 329-357. 
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.   
Falck, Oliver, Stephan Heblich, and Susanne Link (2012). Forced Migration and the Effects of an 
Integration Policy in Post-WWII Germany. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 12(1). 
1935-1682. 
Federal Statistical Office (1952). Statististisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer.  
Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola and Matthias Schündeln (2009). Who Stays, Who Goes, and Who Returns? 
East-West Migration within Germany since Reunification. Economics of Transition 17(3). 703-
738. 
Gillner, Karl (1955). Beihilfen zur Ausbildung für jugendliche Flüchtlinge aus der sowjetischen 
Besatzungszone. Flüchtlingsberater, Bundesminister für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und 
Kriegsgeschadigte, Heft 1. 7-14.  
Government Central Office for Statistics (1955). Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik. Berlin (East): Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. 
29 
 
Heidemeyer, Helge (1994). Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR 1945/1949-1961. Düsseldorf: 
Droste Verlag. 
Hoynes, Hilary, Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach and Douglas Almond (2016). Long-run impacts of 
childhood access to the safety net. American Economic Review, 106(4), 903-34. 
Hoynes, Hilary and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach (2018). Safety net investments in children (No. 
w24594). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hunt, Jennifer (2006). Staunching Emigration from East Germany: Age and the Determinants of 
Migration. Journal of the European Economic Association 4 (5), 1014-1037. 
Kimmel, Elke (2005). Das Notaufnahmeverfahren. In Bettina Effner and Helge Heidemeyer (Eds.), 
Flucht im geteilten Deutschland, pp. 115-134. Berlin: Bebra Verlag. 
Limbach, Eric H. (2011). Unsettled Germans: The Reception and resettlement of East German refugees 
in West Germany, 1949-1961, Michigan State University, Dissertation, 
https://d.lib.msu.edu/etd/1605, downloaded on October 16, 2018. 
Löffler, Bernhard (2007), Rahmenbedingungen, in: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the 
Federal Archive (Eds), Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, Band 4: 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1957-1966, Baden Baden: Nomos, pp. 1-84.  
LoPalo, Melissa (2019). The effects of cash assistance on refugee outcomes. Journal of Public 
Economics, 170, 27-52. 
Løken, Katrine V., Kjell Erik Lommerud and Katrine Holm Reiso (2018). Single mothers and their 
children: Evaluating a work-encouraging welfare reform. Journal of Public Economics, 167, 1-20. 
Lüder, Rudolf (1957). Die Rechte und Vergünstigungen aus dem Flüchtlingsausweis C. Der 
Fachberater, Bundesminister für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, Heft 12. 353-
360. 
Lüttinger, Paul (1986). Der Mythos der schnellen Integration. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 15(1), 20-36.  
Lüttinger, Paul (1989). Integration der Vertriebenen. Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus Verlag.  
Mayer, Susan and Leonard Lopoo (2008), Government Spending and Intergenerational Mobility, 92(1-
2), 139-158. 
Münch, Ursula (2007), Familien-, Jugend- und Altenpolitik, in: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
and the Federal Archive (Eds), Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, Band 4: 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1957-1966, Baden Baden: Nomos, pp. 549-610.  
Münch, Ursula (2005), Familien-, Jugend- und Altenpolitik, in: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
and the Federal Archive (Eds), Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, Band 3: 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1957, Baden Baden: Nomos, pp. 597-652.  
Nahm, Peter (1961). Der Lastenausgleich. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer. 
Prantl, Susanne and Alexandra Spitz-Oener (2019). The Impact of Immigration on Competing Natives' 
Wages: Evidence from German Reunification, Review of Economics and Statistics, accepted for publication.  
Sarvimäki, Matti, Roope Uusitalo, and Markus Jäntti (2019). Habit formation and the misallocation of 
labor: evidence from forced migrations. Available at SSRN 3361356. 
 
30 
 
Schimpl-Neimanns, Bernhard (2016). Mikrozensus Zusatzerhebung „berufliche und soziale 
Umschichtung der Bevölkerung“, April 1971 — Revision der Ordnungsnummern und Hinweise 
zur Hochrechnung. Mimeo, GESIS. 
Schulz, Günther (2005a), Rahmenbedingungen, in: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the 
Federal Archive (Eds), Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, Band 3: 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1957, Baden Baden: Nomos, pp. 1-72.  
Schulz, Günther (2005b), Sozialpolitische Denk- und Handlungsfelder, in: Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs and the Federal Archive (Eds), Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 
1945, Band 3: Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1957, Baden Baden: Nomos, pp. 73-178.  
Tegtmeyer, Heinrich (1979). Berufliche und soziale Umschichtung der Bevölkerung: Methodische 
Anmerkungen zur Planung, Durchführung und Aufbereitung der Befragung. In Heinrich 
Tegtmeyer (Ed.), Soziale Strukturen und Mobilität. Beiträge zur sozio-demographischen Analyse 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp. 17-47. Boldt. 
Van Melis, Damian (2006). Republikucht - Flucht und Abwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR 1945 bis 1961. 
München: Oldenbourg Verlag. 
Werber, Klemens, Günter Bode, and Werner Ehrenforth (1954), Bundesvertriebenengesetz, 
Kohlhammer Kommentare. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer.  
 
 
 






ii i  
i  
i
i i  
i  
i
i i  
i  
ii i  
i  
i
i i  
i  
i
i i  
i  
050
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Pe
rs
on
s M
igr
at
ing
 (1
,0
00
s)
194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102015
Year
East-West Migration
West-East Migration
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emergengy 
Admittance 
Representatives of Allied Forces 
constantly prensent. 
Issuance of a route card and 
documenation of personal details 
of individuals arriving. Notification 
of responsible US officier in case an 
individual might possess important 
information about the GDR. 
Medical Services 
Health certificate 
sick            healthy 
 
US officials 
Interrogation 
 
Relevant 
 information 
US Intelligence 
Service in Berlin 
Interrogation 
Determination of date 
of appearance before 
final committee 
X-ray examination 
(to detect 
tuberculosis 
Committee for Final 
Admittance 
Residence Permit 
Board of Complaint 
Assessment of decision 
concerning residence permit 
Hospital or quarantine in 
emergency admittance 
camp 
 
British officials 
Interrogation 
 
Relevant 
 information 
 
French officials 
Interrogation 
 
 
Relevant 
 information 
 
Assessment of 
competency 
Germans from the GDR? 
State Welfare Agency 
- Counseling 
- Accomadation in main emergency admittance 
camp or in one of the supplementary camps 
- Provision of food 
- Provosion of clothing 
- Provision of hygiene products 
Police 
Registration, 
Assessment of criminal 
records 
Pre-Assessment A 
Application for 
emergency admittance 
Pre-Assessment B-III 
Federal Intelligence Service 
Interrogation 
Pre-Assessment B-II 
“Minsitry for inner German 
relations” 
Interrogation 
 
Pre-Assessment B-I 
Federal Office for the 
Protection of the 
Constitution 
Interrogation 
Charitable organizations, organizations offering counselling services to refugees, 
offices of the political parties from the GDR (parliamentary opposition in exile) 
Federal State 
Allocation 
Allocation Process 
involving representatives 
of the Federal States  
Transportation to 
Federal States other 
than Berlin 
Legal Procedures 
Lawsuit possible 
Berlin 
British Intelligence 
Service in Berlin 
Interrogation 
 
French Intelligence 
Service in Berlin 
Interrogation 
 
Seperate procedures 
for non-German 
nationals 
no 
yes 
               no 
yes 
Agencies in Charge 
 
Government Agency of Berlin 
 
Offices of the Allied Forces 
 
Director of Emergency Admittance 
Procedure  
 
Other 
 
 
 
 
 

